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HERBERT JOHNSON: A LEGAL HISTORIAN'S WORK AND TIMEs
TONY A. FREYER*
Herbert Johnson's scholarship and professional life reveal wide interests,
intellectual rigor, innovation, and deep humanity. A leading authority on Chief
Justice John Marshall's Supreme Court and American colonial and early national
constitutional-legal history, Johnson's many publications also include such
subjects as comparative constitutionalism of the United States, Canada, and
Australia, a photographic essay on New York court houses, the religious societies
of South Carolina, Shakespeare's legal and political background, and a history of
United States Army aviation through World War I. Amidst this extensive research
and writing program, Johnson taught not only constitutional-legal history or
constitutional law in history departments and the law school, but also courses
ranging from the legal and social consequences of industrialism, to domestic
relations, and trusts and estates. His professional activities embrace bar admissions
in several federal and state jurisdictions, administrative positions in Chase
Manhattan Bank, private law practice in New York City, service in the United
States Air Force Reserve-retired at the rank of Colonel-editorial positions at the
John Marshall and John Jay papers, Chaplain Associate and Hospice Volunteer,
Baptist Medical Center, Columbia South Carolina, Vocational Deacon of the
Episcopal Church in the diocese of Upper South Carolina and of Western North
Carolina, study at the Lutheran Theological Southern Seminary, and being
sometime-president of the American Society for Legal History. In 1999 and 2001
he also promoted the diminishing field of constitutional history through conferences
bringing together younger and older scholars.
The "times" of my title refer to changing phases of historiography since the
1950s when Johnson chose to become a legal historian. "It is perhaps inescapable,"
wrote the historian of German historiography, Georg Iggers, "that the historian
approaches history from a standpoint that reflects the imprint of his personality and
of the social and cultural framework within which he writes."' Johnson's
engagement with legal history began in the early 1950s when, as a "professional
option" student in Columbia University's undergraduate and law school program,
he came under the influence of the Law School's Julius Goebel. Johnson later
wrote that "financial considerations compelled me to transfer to the evening
division of New York Law School," 2 where Paul Hamlin, a legal historian teaching
constitutional law inspired him, upon completion of the law degree, to pursue the
study of legal history rather than entering law practice. By the time he received his
Ph.D. in American History and Comparative Law from Columbia University in
1965, Johnson had also studied at the United States Air Force's Special
Investigation School in Washington, D.C. and New York University's School of
Business Administration, practiced law, and worked in the Custody and Trust
Divisions of Chase Manhattan Bank.
* University Research Professor of History and Law, University of Alabama. The author thanks
Dean Kenneth C. Randall, The University of Alabama Law School Foundation, and The Edward Brett
Randolph Fund.
1. Tony A. Freyer, Objectivity and Involvement: Georg G. Iggers and Writing the History of the
Little Rock School Crisis, in CROSSING BOUNDARIES: THE EXCLUSION AND INCLUSION OF MINORITIES
IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 172, 172 (Larry Eugene Jones ed., 2001) (quoting Georg G.
Iggers).
2. HERBERT A. JOHNSON, ESSAYS ON NEW YORK COLONIAL LEGAL HISTORY vi (1981).
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Within these diverse personal and institutional imperatives, Johnson developed
his approach to law and society. Inspired by Richard B. Morris's revision of
Frederick Jackson Turner's "frontier thesis,"3 Johnson examined the impact
geography, demographic density, land holding practices, scarcity of labor, and
family relationships had on the market for legal services and the operation of courts
in colonial and early national America. He drew lessons from Goebel's study of
American lawyers' gradual, yet steadily growing, use of English rules-which
ultimately revealed more continuity than difference between the two law
regimes-and Morris's focus upon departures from English legal forms, evidencing
a process of Americanization. Like Goebel, Johnson demanded of legal historians
a rigorous understanding of legal procedure and process. Yet Johnson successfully
blended this faithful obedience to legal forms with Morris's evaluation of how and
why a provincial civilization slowly emerged possessing sufficient distinctiveness
that elites such as John Jay or John Marshall could risk their fate and fortune on the
struggle for Independence. More than his mentors, moreover, Johnson expanded
this analysis to include lawyer biography, considering especially what the political,
religious, and the British imperial context of law practice revealed about the ways
in which civil and private institutions of governance fostered or impeded
constitutional and social change. From George L. Haskins, Johnson learned to
evaluate whether ideas reflected in the taught traditions of legal forms and law
practice were malleable or static.
A few examples suggest Johnson's influence on the study of colonial American
law and society. An early examination of the reception issue in New York indicated
that the common law's Anglicanization of the former Dutch colony during the later
seventeenth century proceeded gradually and, ultimately, was never completed
because the system of private manorial courts remained largely intact. The British
accommodation of multiple jurisdictional authority promoted social and political
pluralism among the Dutch and English settler communities, curbing but not
extinguishing, the "extreme republican tendencies of the Puritan townspeople."4
Remarkably, the manorial system's imprint persists in New York property law
down to the present. A more recent study of criminal sanctions in colonial North
America considered such social outcomes as Massachusetts' imposition of
punishments through Biblical codes to maintain the spiritual and moral integrity of
the community. Nevertheless, throughout colonial America, efforts to punish moral
offenses declined; also, provincial authorities were unable to control "intercolonial
and imperial crime syndicates." 5 Punishments were administered along social-class
lines with lower ranks subjected to corporal punishment while gentlemen were
fined, banished, or imprisoned. The lack of a circulating currency and widespread
poverty nonetheless often limited the imposition of fires. English and colonial
sanctions differed widely regarding forfeiture of real and personal property. The
Americans anticipated Beccaria's view that by impoverishing the family, forfeiture
tempted them into a life of crime and thus defeated the "public purpose of
punishment."6
As Johnson sharpened the focus upon the interaction between legal institutions
and society, he developed innovative methodological techniques. Johnson's broad
3. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 4.
4. Herbert Alan Johnson, The Advent of Common Law in Colonial New York, in LAW &
AUTHORITY IN COLONIAL AMERICA 74, 83 (George Athen Billias ed., 1965).
5. Herbert A. Johnson, Sanctions in Colonial North America, in 4 PUNISHMENT: TRANSACTIONS
OF THE JEAN BODIN SOCIETY FOR COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY LVIII 109, 130 (1991).
6. Id. at 147.
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survey of some twenty-two lawyers' libraries showing relatively extensive holdings
of imported eighteenth-century law treatises suggested the social and political
dimensions of the law practice and the legal mind of Thomas Jefferson and John
Adams, as well as lesser known lights at the bar such as Francis Dana, James
Grindlay, Peter Leigh, John Mercer, Benet Oldham, Robert T. Paine, and St George
Tucker. Even so, the survey indicated not only the inter-colonial and interstate
variations in the subject matter of law practice, but more importantly, it provided
a way to gauge American departures from English forms, including the inconsistent
uses of equity, the weaker respect for precedent, and the preference for substance
over form in property, criminal, commercial, and admiralty law. This study also
exposed the habits of mind underlying the declaratory theory of law whereby
American "[lawyers in an age of reason sought in the immutable principles of the
law of nature the foundation for man-made laws and regulations, as well as a
legitimization of national and municipal law through its conformity with the
historical practices of mankind."7 Combined with the editorial work in the Jay and
Marshall papers and a thorough understanding of the period's legal records, case
law and the administration of justice from the local to the trans-Atlantic level, the
survey gave Johnson further insight into the ways legal institutions reflected and
shaped social and political conflict.
This methodological creativity yielded Johnson's well known studies of the
Marshall Court's litigation patterns. During his graduate work at Columbia
University, Johnson acquired respect for what statistical data could reveal about
institutional patterns. In 1968, the year after he began editing the Marshall papers,
Johnson wrote a piece employing statistics to examine the Marshall Court's
decision-making process and results. He sought from West Publishing Company
the case law data organized as digest categories; when West was unable or
unwilling to help, he developed his own computer program using punch cards.'
Over the years, Johnson developed a comprehensive record of Supreme Court and
lower federal court decisions during Marshall's thirty-four year tenure as Chief
Justice. Manipulating this data, Johnson revealed new insight into the small group
dynamics of Marshall and his colleagues as they struggled to establish an
independent judiciary against powerful Jeffersonian and Jacksonian adversaries
from 1801 to 1835. The data constituted solid evidence for the emergence of a
seniority rule among the members of the Court governing the assignment of
opinions which demonstrated both the scope and limit of the Chief Justice's
influence. In addition, graphs of the digest categories plotting the patterns of lower
court and Supreme Court decisions demonstrated how--despite ongoing opposition
and episodic defeat-the federal courts emerged, as described by Alexis de
Tocqueville, as the most powerful judiciary in the world. The subject-matter
outcomes also revealed how judicial, as opposed to legislative, process promoted
a distinctive American capitalism, accommodating both free labor and slavery.
Johnson's photographic essay of New York courthouses of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries further suggested a versatile imagination at work. Johnson's
collection of photographs included "halls of justice" constructed prior to 1890
located across some forty-nine counties across the Empire State. Accompanying
each photo is historical interpretation which presents architectural and other
aesthetic points, as well as anecdotes-particularly famous cases-relating to
7. HERBERT A. JOHNSON, IMPORTED EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY LAW TREATISES IN AMERICAN
LIBRARIES 1700-1799 xxiv (1978).
8. Interview with Herbert A. Johnson, Professor Emeritus of Law, University of South Carolina
School of Law (Sept. 22, 2004).
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dramatic events occurring within the judicial building. The book's Introduction
asserts that "the county courthouse occupies a unique and revered place in
American life. More than any other structure, it symbolizes the formative and
unifying influence that law and the tradition of constitutionalism have played in the
history of the United States."9 Overall, the book's words and pictures convey the
human dimensions of Americans' paradoxical faith that, ultimately, democracy
should be subordinate to the supremacy of unelected judges. Thus, through the
images of local judicial authority, the book manages to convey the peculiar
democratic consciousness William Faulkner depicted in the novel Sanctuary: "The
air entered the open windows and blew.. . back to... the door, laden.., with that
unmistakable odor of courtrooms; that musty odor of spent lusts and greeds and
bickerings and bitterness, and withal a certain clumsy stability in lieu of anything
better."'
Robert Gordon noted Johnson's wide ranging contribution to legal
historiography in 1975. Gordon's assessment of American legal history employed
a distinction between "internal" and "external" approaches illustrated by a "box"
metaphor." The "internalist" was preoccupied with "distinctive-appearing legal
things" inside the box, "such as changes in pleading rules, in the jurisdiction of a
court, the texts assigned to beginning law students, or the doctrine of contributory
negligence."' 2 Gordon described the "external historian," by contrast, as one who
"writes about the interaction between the boxful of legal things and the wider
society of which they are part, in particular to explore the social context of law and
its social effects" and "conclusions about those effects."' Gordon's dichotomy is
useful for my purposes because in the mid-1970s, he ranked Herbert Alan Johnson
among the "best" of those "few exceptions" writing "American legal history" of the
"external kind."' 4 Others he noted were Daniel J. Boorstin, George L. Haskins,
Stanley Katz, Lawrence M. Friedman, and Morton J. Horwitz. I find the metaphor
helpful, too, because Gordon presented Goebel as a leading representative of
"inside the box" legal historians." Thus, Johnson selected the appreciation of legal
forms from his former teacher, but rather than being fixated with their autonomous
institutional meaning, these forms were Johnson's starting point for new ways to
explore law's interaction with the wider society.
Gordon's assessment also infers an illuminating distinction between Johnson's
and Willard Hurst's practice of legal history. Gordon recognized the philosophical
pragmatism and the Brandeisian progressive tradition which shaped Hurst's leading
role in making "external" legal history dominant by the 1970s. He argues that
while Hurst expanded the box to include virtually all law making authorities-not
only courts oriented toward elites but legislatures and even private associations
reflecting democratic interests-the emphasis was primarily on the "social
functions" affecting ordinary people bearing the heavy and unequal burden of
institutional inertia and drift. Johnson, by contrast, insisted as strongly as Goebel
on the need to understand and correctly apply the procedural and substantive
9. HERBERT ALAN JOHNSON & RALPH K. ANDRIST, HISTORIC COURTHOUSES OF NEW YORK
STATE: 18TH AND 19TH CENTURY HALLS OF JUSTICE ACROSS THE EMPIRE STATE 14 (1977).
10. WILLIAM FAULKNER, SANCTUARY 273 (1958).
11. Robert H. Gordon, Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in
American Legal Historiography, 10 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 9, 10-11 (1975).
12. Id. at 11.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1I n.6.
15. Id.
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character of legal rules with which lawyers, judges, and legislators worked amidst
conflicting social, political, and economic demands and inequities. Unlike his
mentor, however, Johnson developed evidence and methods which revealed how
seemingly neutral and autonomous institutional forms and processes-both
instrumentally and symbolically-defined and channeled the choices available to
people within a given historical context. The focus firmly remained on individuals
possessing and using their expertise to address the needs or resistence of other
individuals or groups. Johnson's focus upon a contextual analysis of the ways in
which practitioners-usually lawyers, judges and legislators, but, most recently,
also aviators--employ technical skill in relation to myriad concrete expectations
and pressures constitutes the internals and externals of Johnson's legal history
"box."
These two modes of "external" legal history present telling contrasts of the
primary preoccupation of current American legal historiography. Since the 1970s,
the work of older and younger generations of legal historians increasingly have
diverged. Hurst's influence remains strong among the former group, whereas the
latter group has focused largely upon "law and society," defined in terms of
dominant institutional authorities imposing inequitable instrumental and symbolic
"otherness" across gender, race, and class relations. Recently, Barbara Welke
described present legal historiography as an "archipelago" in which the various
islands of law and society remain isolated from one another. Citations to Hurst's
work rarely appear among the many studies of "otherness." Notwithstanding
massive "democratic detail" demonstrating that the "condition of growth" in
American law "is the accommodation of conflicting interests," Gordon observed,
"Hurst's normative view of the decision-making process may somewhat blunt a
sense of historical irony."'6 Thus, even though Hurst recognized that inequitable
policy outcomes were inevitable, his Brandeisian progressivism and philosophical
pragmatism led him to emphasize how this conflict reflected the strength or
weakness of majoritarian democratic values and interests. Legal historians
exploring the other's struggle for empowerment against inequality and injustice
assume that elites manipulate democratic institutions in order to maintain
domination. Proceeding from that assumption, Hurst's studies seem, indeed, to
possess little relevance.
Johnson's review of The Many Legalities of Early America suggests that his
legal history remains more useful. This book, edited by Christopher L. Tomlins
and Bruce H. Mann, includes wide-ranging studies which address the profound
issues of otherness through deep understanding of legal forms. Johnson describes
the work as a "land mark" in the study of early American law and society because
its interdisciplinary social and economic perspectives reveal powerful insight into
"substantive and procedural law."' 7 Thus, reflecting his own scholarly focus since
the 1950s, Johnson lauds the "fact that the authors really understand the law" and
praises them for successful efforts to "enrich our appreciation of traditional legal
history."' 8 One example is Katherine Hermes' examination of English and
Algonquian practices of intestate succession whereby the native custom steadily
approached the English rule. Johnson gives particular attention to the essays
concerning the "position of early American women." 9 Linda Strutz goes beyond
16. Id. at 53, 54.
17. Herbert Johnson, Book Review, VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 491, 491 (2002) (reviewing
THE MANY LEGALITIES OF EARLY AMERICA (Christopher L. Tomlins & Bruce H. Mann eds., 2001).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 492.
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Richard Morris's pioneering studies of wives managing the absent husband's
business affairs within coverture to demonstrate how wives further weakened the
system through powers of attorney. This power enabled widows to "administer her
deceased husband's estate even after remarriage, ' served as antenuptial
agreements giving the wife control of her separate property, and could function as
a quasi-separation agreement as a result of the husband's infidelity. Johnson
concludes with Terri L. Snyder's fascinating study of wives' property rights being
the basis for male relatives' franchise qualification. Wives or slaves also
circumvented statutes prohibiting an office-seeker "treating" voters, by offering
alcohol and food when he was away."
This short review reflects more intangible attributes of Johnson's career. His
appreciation of younger scholars work recognizes how much legal history research
and writing often are lonely pursuits which nonetheless directly or indirectly require
ongoing assistance and support. "Only when you have worked alone-when you
have felt around you a black gulf of solitude . . . and in hope and despair have
trusted in your unshaken will-then only," wrote Oliver Wendell Holmes, "can you
gain the secret isolated joy of the thinker, who knows that, a hundred years after he
is dead and forgotten, men who never heard of him will be moving to the measure
of his thought.... ."22 Unlike Holmes, of course, Johnson freely acknowledged that
all historians depend upon the contributions of many others. Still, Holmes' basic
appreciation of the costs and rewards of solitary endeavor rings true, I think,
considering the originality and scope of Johnson's scholarly accomplishment. Even
so, Johnson's assessment of Marshall's humanity is true of Johnson himself:
Lawyers and judges are social pathologists; it is hard to remain an
idealist about human nature while serving as a member of the
legal profession. Yet Marshall, although acutely aware of the
shortcomings that he and others shared, never lost his enthusiasm
for life nor his interest, respect, and deep concern for people. '
Here is an attitude toward life in legal history worthy of emulation.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 491.
22. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Profession of The Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 29, 32
(1920).
23. HERBERT A. JOHNSON, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF JOHN MARSHALL 1801-1835 262-63
(1977).
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